Reply to O\u27Connor by Aspenson, Steven S.
Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers 
Volume 6 Issue 1 Article 8 
1-1-1989 
Reply to O'Connor 
Steven S. Aspenson 
Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy 
Recommended Citation 
Aspenson, Steven S. (1989) "Reply to O'Connor," Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers: Vol. 6 : Iss. 1 , Article 8. 
Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol6/iss1/8 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative 
exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange. 
REPLY TO O'CONNOR 
Steven S. Aspenson 
In this reply I consider David O'Connor's article "A Variation on the Free Will Defense" 
in which he tries to show that natural evil is necessary for free will by showing that it is 
required for the possibility of "morally creditable frec choice." I argue that O'Connor's 
reply to an anticipated objection was unsuccessful in showing that humans can be moral 
without the property he calls "p." that an altered understanding of what "morally creditable 
free choice" is would not help. and finally, that if God's moral condition is fundamentally 
different than ours, it could not be used as an example of p being inessential for humans 
being moral. 
In his article "A Variation on the Free Will Defense," I David O'Connor tries to 
show that "natural evil" is a logically necessary condition for the possibility of 
"morally creditable free choice." I shall show, 
1) that O'Connor's reply to an anticipated objection was unsuccessful in 
showing that humans can be moral without the property he calls "p," the property 
of being prone to choosing possible evils which he takes to be a natural evil, 
2) that an altered understanding of what "morally creditable free choice" is 
would not help, and finally, 
3) that if God's moral condition is fundamentally different than ours, it could 
not be used as an example of p being inessential for humans being moral. 
O'Connor calls being "prone to choosing possible evils" property p and takes 
property p to be a natural evil according to a tradition that, if a kind of thing 
could be better without it, it is a natural evil. 
He also claims 
If moral credit is to be earned, the possible evils resisted or rejected 
have to be tempting to some significant degree . . . it is internal to the 
concept of moral achievement that we be, let us say, prone to choosing 
possible evils.' 
That is, if one has moral achievement, then one has the natural evil p. 
One of the objections he anticipates, the second, is 
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. that humans not having p could never be moral beings; that being 
moral is objectively a better human state than being non-moral; thus, 
that p, being necessary for the former, could not be a natural evil. 3 
That is, since moral humans are better humans, p is not a natural evil of humans. 
His reply to this objection was the following: 
Being moral is not impossible without p, because, presumably God, by 
definition, would be both moral and without the attribute p. 4 
But that reply obscures the point of the objection because the question here is 
not "is it possible to be moral without the property p?" but rather "is it possible 
for humans to be moral without the property p?" If that point were explicitly 
addressed the reply would have read 
Being moral is not impossible for humans without p, because, presum-
ably God, by definition, would be both moral and without the attribute p. 
That reply is ineffective because if we substitute for the property p, the property 
q, which is, let us say, the property of "having a body" and substitute "alive" 
for "moral," we have the following: 
Being alive is not impossible for humans without q, because, presumably 
God, by definition, would be both alive and without the attribute q. 
Obviously that does not show that humans can "be alive" without a body, and 
similarly it does not follow that humans can be moral without the property p 
simply because God can. In fact, nothing about humans follows from any claim 
about only God. So O'Connor has not shown humans can be moral without the 
natural evil p, and the objection he anticipates (that on his view p is required 
for humans being moral and thus not a natural evil of humans) has not been 
successfully rebutted. 
II 
O'Connor might reply to this that all that follows is that since p is not a natural 
evil of humans, humans are incapable of moral achievement. But that is unlikely. 
Rather, he may claim MCFC (morally creditable free choice,) which he apparently 
takes to be necessary for moral achievement, is one of the following: 
A) a free choice which is capable of rendering the agent praiseworthy, and 
therefore moral 
B) a free choice which renders an already moral agent more mature 
and he may then claim he takes MCFC to be B whereas I have construed it to be A. 
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So, I may have misunderstood just what he takes morally creditable free choice 
to be, which is understandable since O'Connor's formulation of it is ambiguous 
between A and B. What would make B attractive to him is that an already moral 
agent might not need p, a possibility he brings up in a later context to which 
my remarks apply insofar as humans are the agents considered. In particular his 
replies to the third5 and fourth6 objections, as well as the posing of the fourth 
objection, are based on the supposed (logical?) possibility that there is a world 
" ... in which human beings do not have p and are moral to begin with,"7 that 
is, they are correctly described by B and not by A, the topic to which I now tum. 
What O'Connor needs for moral maturity if B describes what he takes it to 
be, apart from whether p is required, is some property, call it r, which would 
be something like "the capacity to gain moral virtues by practice and habit," a 
fa Aristotle, and this property does not seem to be a defect. 
What then becomes of A and B? That distinction breaks down because whether 
one is already moral or one becomes moral the following seems to be true of 
humans. 
C) If there were no conditions in which a being S could find it attractive to 
refrain from what would make one morally praiseworthy, then S could never be 
morally praiseworthy and 
D) any being that could never be morally praiseworthy could never be a moral 
being 
then, given C and D, there is something required for being moral and becoming 
moral, and p is a candidate for it, or a condition of it, and the original objection 
that p is a property necessary for humans being moral, and therefore not a natural 
evil, retains whatever force it had. 
III 
Finally, O'Connor's reply that God can be moral without the property p calls 
for comment. This, I think, is part of a traditional view that God does not acquire 
His praiseworthiness from His choices. That is, since God is praiseworthy, His 
choices are also, rather than the alternative that since His choices are praiseworthy, 
He is rendered praiseworthy, as though it were possible that God not be praisewor-
thy.' It would be a mistake, I think, to assume that beings who have their natures 
conferred upon them (rather than being self-sufficient e.g., God) could be 
praiseworthy, without becoming praiseworthy. At least an argument is needed 
to show humans could be created in a morally praiseworthy condition. 
This is enough, I think, to show that O'Connor's reply to the second objection 
he anticipates to his view (that natural evil is a necessary condition for morally 
creditable free choice) was not effective; the objection that p is necessary for 
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humans being moral, and therefore not a natural evil, retains whatever force it 
had, which at present, prevents use of the replies he offers to the third and fourth 
anticipated objections, as well as his posing of the fourth objection. Q 
University of Wisconsin-LaCrosse 
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